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Abstract
A fundamental question of human society is the evolution of cooperation.
Many previous studies explored this question via setting spatial background,
where players obtain their payoffs by playing game with their nearest neigh-
bors. Another undoubted fact is that environment plays an important role
in the individual development. Inspired by these phenomena, we reconsider
the definition of individual fitness which integrates the environment, denoted
by the average payoff of all individual neighbors, with the traditional indi-
vidual payoffs by introducing a selection parameter u. Tuning u equal to
zero returns the traditional version, while increasing u bears the influence
of environment. We find that considering the environment, i.e., integrat-
ing neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness, promotes cooperation. If we
enhance the value of u, the invasion of defection could be resisted better.
We also provide quantitative explanations and complete phase diagrams pre-
senting the influence of environment on the evolution of cooperation. Finally,
the universality of this mechanism is testified for different neighborhood sizes,
different topology structures and different game models. Our work may shed
a light on the emergence and persistence of cooperation in our life.
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1. Introduction
The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals has become
a major challenge in the biology and evolution research since the altruism
and unselfish seems incompatible with Darwinian selection. Nevertheless,
cooperation can be abundantly found in animal and human societies. In
order to interpret these universal cooperative phenomena, evolutionary game
theory has become a useful tool to study this puzzling dilemma [1, 2, 3].
Of particular renown is the prisoner’s dilemma game, which as a paradigm
illustrates the social conflict between altruistic and selfish behaviors and has
attracted much attention in both theoretical and experimental studies [4].
In the original form of the game, there exist two players, and they have to
simultaneously decide whether to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). Naturally,
their payoffs depend on their decisions: they can get R (P ) while mutual
cooperation (defection); if a defector meets a cooperator, the former can
obtain a maximum individual payoff T and the latter can only get a minimal
payoff S. The ranking of the four payoffs must satisfy T > R > P > S
and 2R > T + S. Since the defector always outperforms the cooperator,
irrespective of the opponent’s choice, two players will inevitably fall into
the mutual defection state. Over the past decades, many mechanisms have
been proposed to overcome this dilemma, such as kin selection [5], direct and
indirect reciprocity [6, 7], voluntary participation [8] and spatial structure
[9, 10]. Among these achievements, the most prominent success is obtained
by the spatial extension.
In the pioneer work by Nowak and May [10], players were arranged on
the vertex of a square lattice, and their payoffs were gathered from playing
the game with their nearest neighbors. Then players were allowed to adopt
the strategy of their neighbors, provided their payoff was higher. It was
shown that the emergence and sustainment of cooperation could be greatly
improved. Along this way, much effort has been given to discover new mech-
anisms that can sustain stable cooperation. They include the interplay be-
tween evolutionary games and network structure (regular networks [11, 12],
small world networks [13, 14, 15] and scale-free networks [16, 17, 18]), envi-
ronmental noise [19, 20, 21], additional noise introducing into payoffs [22, 23],
teaching activity [24, 25, 26], the mobility of players [27, 28], asymmetric pay-
off [29, 30], differences in evolutionary time scales [31], aspiring to the fittest
[32, 33]. For recent surveys of this field, one can refer to two extensive reviews
[34, 35].
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In the present work, we mainly focus on the research of individual fitness
during the process of evolution. For the majority of previous researches, a
player’s fitness in the spatial structure equals the current accumulated payoff
collected from its direct neighbors. Indeed, the meaning of fitness is often
related to the reproduction ability [36, 37] and some works exhibiting the
relationships between payoff and fitness are also presented. For example,
Ohtsuki et.al. defined fitness as the accumulated payoff with a background
noise [38]; Szolnoki et.al. featured fitness as mixture of accumulated payoff
and normalized payoff [39]; Jia et.al. drew fitness as the accumulated payoff
with a fluctuation coefficient [40]; and other researchers described fitness as
combination of current payoff and past payoffs [41, 42, 43]. Inspired by their
instructive suggestions, we propose a new method to define individual fitness
where neighborhoods are considered.
As is known, environment plays an indispensable role in the real life and
it can usually affect individual development. For example, people in the elite
teams are more likely to learn technical ability from their excellent teammates
to enhance competitiveness of themselves, animals in the strong groups are
more easily to prey or resist the predators. Therefore, it is natural to take
environment presented by the average payoff of all individual neighbors into
account when talking about individual fitness. Here we redefine the individ-
ual fitness via integrating its current accumulated payoff with average payoff
of all individual neighbors, and find that the evolution of cooperation can be
remarkably promoted.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will first de-
scribe evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game and the adjusted definition of
fitness. Subsequently, the main simulation results and discussions will be
presented in Section 3. And the conclusion is summarized in the last section.
2. The Model
For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we consider an evolutionary
prisoner’s dilemma game with the rescaled payoff matrix: T = b, R = 1 and
P = S = 0, where the parameter b (1 < b < 2) represents the temptation
to choose defection. Initially, cooperators and defectors are randomly dis-
tributed on a square L × L square lattice with equal probability. At each
time step, player i firstly acquires its payoff Pi by playing game with its di-
rect neighbors. Next, the payoffs Pj of all the neighbors of player i can be
3
Figure 1: (color online) Characteristic snapshots of cooperators (red) and defectors (gray)
for different values of the parameter u. From (a) to (d) u = 0, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6, respectively.
Depicted results were obtained for b = 1.20 and K = 0.1 on a 100× 100 square lattice.
obtained by means of the same way as player i, and the environment could
be characterized by the average value of all neighbors’ payoffs Pj , that is,
P =
∑ki
j=1 Pj
ki
, (1)
where the sum runs over all the neighbors of player i, and ki denotes
the neighbor number of player i. Then we evaluate the fitness of player i
according to the following expression:
fi = (1− u)× Pi + u× P , (2)
where 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 is a tunable parameter. Obviously, when u = 0,
the fitness mathematically equals the accumulated payoff Pi, which does not
consider the influence of environment and goes back to the traditional version
[19, 24, 32]. Interestingly, as u increases, the environment will hold larger
proportion. After each step of the game, players synchronously update their
strategies. When player i is to update its strategy, it will randomly select
a neighbor j and adopt its strategy with a probability W(i→j) depending on
the fitness difference. namely
W(i→j) =
1
1 + exp[(fi − fj)/K ]
, (3)
where 0 < K < +∞ characterizes the environmental noise, including ir-
rationality and errors. The effect of noise K has been well studied in previous
literatures[19, 32, 33, 46].
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3. Simulation Results and Discussion
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Figure 2: (color online) (a):Frequency of cooperators Fc in dependence on the parameter
b for different values of the parameter u. Note that comparing with the traditional version
(i.e., u = 0), the cooperation can be greatly improved in our version. (b): Critical thresh-
old values of b = bc, marking extinction of cooperators, in dependence on the parameter
u for different neighborhood sizes. Note that the value of bc will monotonously increase
with the the increase of u, irrespective of the neighborhood size. Due to the scale of the
parameter b(1 < b < 2), bc > 2 is canceled. Depicted results were obtained for K = 0.1.
Simulations below were carried out on a 100×100 square lattice. The key
quantity frequency of cooperators F
c
was determined within 104 full Monte
Carlo steps after sufficiently long transients were discarded. Moreover, each
data were averaged over up to 20 independent runs for each set of parameter
values in order to assure suitable accuracy.
We start by visually inspecting the spatial patterns formed by coopera-
tors and defectors for different values of the adjusting parameter u. Figure
1 shows the results obtained by b = 1.20 and K = 0.1. For u = 0 (Fig.1(a)),
the model returns the traditional model and the system falls into the pure-
defector state when b is not very large; for µ = 0.2 (Fig.1(b)), a small fraction
of cooperators can sustain by forming the small yet compact clusters to re-
sist the invasion of defectors; for u = 0.4 (Fig.1(c)), cooperators outperform
defectors and they can form strong and large clusters to survive and prevail;
for u = 0.6 (Fig.1(d)), the system will be entirely dominated by cooperation
strategy. These results reveal that considering the environment, i.e., inte-
grating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness, can greatly enhance the
evolution of cooperation.
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Figure 3: (color online) Three typical sub-patterns in the spatial game: (a) a defector
surrounded by cooperators; (b) a cooperator surrounded by defectors; (c) cooperators and
defectors are evenly mixed.
To quantify the effect of u more precisely, we examine the relationship
between the frequency of cooperators F
c
and the temptation to defect b for
different values of u. As is shown in Fig.2(a), cooperation monotonously de-
creases with the increase of b no matter under what value of u. Interestingly,
it is evident that u plays a crucial role in the evolution of cooperation: the
larger the value of u, the higher the cooperation level. In particular, when u
is considerably large (u ≥ 0.8), the defectors still go extinct even if defectors
possess great advantage over cooperators (b = 2.0), which indicates that the
effect of u (i.e., integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness) on
facilitating cooperation is very conspicuous. Moreover, it is also worth not-
ing how the critical value bc, marking the extinction of cooperators, varies
in dependence on the parameter u for different neighborhood sizes. Fig.2(b)
demonstrates clearly the existence of an optimal neighborhood size when the
value of u is small, that is, cooperation can be better promoted in an interme-
diate neighborhood size, which is in agreement with the result of traditional
version [44]. Whereas, as the value of u increasing this trend will change, and
small neighborhood size will be more beneficial for the evolution of coopera-
tion. More importantly, we can observe that although the survival space for
cooperators is becoming smaller and smaller, which could be predicted from
the mean-field approximation [34, 45], the threshold value of cooperators bc
will monotonously enhance with the increasing of u, irrespective of the neigh-
borhood sizes. This suggests that such a facilitation effect on cooperation is
robust to different neighborhood sizes.
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Figure 4: (color online) The transition possibility between the circled cooperator and
defector in Fig.3. (a) corresponds to the pattern of Fig.3(a); (b) corresponds to the pattern
of Fig.3(b); (c) corresponds to the pattern of Fig.3(c). Depicted results were obtained for
K = 0.1.
Next we will analyze the underlying mechanism for this kind of promo-
tion effect. Figure 3 shows three typical sub-patterns on square lattices,
pattern (a): a defector is surrounded by cooperators; pattern (b): a cooper-
ator encircled by defectors; pattern (c): cooperators and defectors are evenly
mixed. Here we will focus on the strategy transition between the circled red
cooperator and the circled blue defector. Before the formal analysis, it is in-
dispensable to predefine some useful parameters. We assume that faC , f
b
C , f
c
C
(faD, f
b
D, f
c
D) are the fitness of the circled cooperator (defector) in pattern (a),
pattern (b), pattern (c), respectively; ∆a,∆b,∆c are the fitness difference of
the circled cooperator and the circled defector in pattern (a), pattern (b),
pattern (c), respectively; andW aC→D,W
b
C→D,W
c
C→D (W
a
D→C,W
b
D→C,W
c
D→C )
are the transition possibility of the circled cooperator to become defector (the
circled defector to become cooperator) in pattern (a), pattern (b), pattern
(c), respectively. According to Eq.(2), we have:
∆a = f
a
D − f
a
C = (4b− 3) + (3.75− 5b)u
∆b = f
b
D − f
b
C = b(1− 2u)
∆c = f
c
D − f
c
C = 2(b− 1)(1− u).
(4)
The fitness difference of cooperators and defectors is crucial for the evolu-
tion of cooperation. Several previous works have shown that the emergence of
cooperation on lattices is often induced by the formation of cooperator clus-
ters, where cooperators can obtain higher payoff (fitness) to protect them-
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selves against the invasion of defectors. From Eq.(4), we can find ∆a,∆b,∆c
monotonously decrease with the increase of u, which indicates large value
of u can weaken the advantage of defectors, and will be greatly beneficial
for the evolution of cooperation. Additionally, Figure 4 clearly demonstrates
the transition possibility of the circled cooperator and circled defector when
varying value of b for three sub-patterns. One can observe that, although
the cross points of WD→C and WC→D are different, the result is consistent
that as u increases, a defector is more likely to turn into a cooperator yet a
cooperator is harder to become a defector.
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Figure 5: (color online)Full b−K phase diagram for u = 0.2 (a) and u = 0.4 (b), obtained
via Monte Carlo simulations of the prisoner’s dilemma game on the square lattice. The
blue and red lines mark the border between stationary pure C and D phases and the mixed
C+D phase, respectively. Resembling with previous works [20, 22], it can be observed that
for u = 0.2 (a) there exists an intermediate uncertainty in the strategy adoption process
(an intermediate value of K) for which the survivability of cooperators is maximal, i.e., Fc
is maximal. However, the borderline separating the pure C and the mixed C+D phase for
the u = 0.4 case (b) exhibits a monotonically decreasing curve, the D ↔ C+D transition
is qualitatively different.
Furthermore, we will examine how the parameter u affect the evolution
of cooperation under different levels of uncertainty. The later can be tuned
via K (see Eq.(3)),which acts as a temperature parameter in the employed
Fermi strategy adoption function [11]. In the case of K → 0, the strategy of
selected neighbor is always adopted provided that its fitness is higher. While
in the limit K → ∞, all information is lost, and switching to neighbor’s
strategy is like tossing a coin. For accurately solving the problem, we obtain
the full b−K phase diagrams for some characteristic values of u on the square
lattice.
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The phase diagram illustrated in Fig.5(a) is well-known, and implies the
existence of an optimal level of uncertainty for the evolution cooperation, as
was previously reported in [20, 22]. In particular, note the the D ↔ C+D
transition line is bell shaped, indicating that K ≈ 0.3 is the optimal temper-
ature where cooperators are able to survive at the highest value of b. This
phenomenon as the evolution resonance can only be observed on the inter-
action topologies lacking the overlapping triangles [19]. On the other hand,
comparing to the traditional phase diagram [20, 22, 32], i.e. u = 0, the
survival space of mixed strategies C+D is enhanced greatly, which will be
helpful for the emergence of cooperation. Interestingly, the increasing of u
completely eradicates (as do interaction networks incorporating overlapping
triangles) the existence of an optimal K, as presented in Fig.5(b). The bell
shaped D ↔ C+D transition line gives way to a monotonously decreasing
line, indicating the enhancement of uncertainty level will directly accelerate
the dying out of cooperators. This quantitative change in the phase diagram
implies that increasing the tunable parameter u or the proportion of environ-
ment in the individual fitness will affectively alter the interaction networks.
Though the square lattice evidently lacks the overlapping triangles, which
guarantees the existence of an optimal K for the small values of u, consid-
ering neighborhoods in the fitness seems to alter the likelihood and enables
the linkage of essentially disconnected triplets realized. A similar report was
recently investigated in public goods games, in which the joint membership
in large groups was also found to alter the effective interaction network and
thus the impact of uncertainly on the evolution of cooperation [46].
Lastly, it remains of interest to explore the generalization of cooperation
promotion for such a new mechanism, we investigate the systematic cooper-
ative behaviors under different complex networks and different game models
(Fig.6). Similarly as Figure 2, it can be observed that the cooperation level
can be greatly promoted with the increzse of u for prisoner’s dilemma game
on the small world network and the random regular graph. At the same time,
it shows that the evolution of cooperation can be effectively guaranteed for
snowdrift game and public goods game on square lattices. The result is spe-
cially inspiring in snowdrift game, since cooperation is usually thought to be
inhibited by the spatial structure [36].
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Figure 6: (color online) Frequency of cooperators Fc in dependence on the parameter b
(or r) for different values of the parameter u for different complex networks and different
game models: (a) prisoner’s dilemma game on the Watts-Strogatz small world network
(SW) with the fraction of rewired links equalling 0.1; (b) prisoner’s dilemma game on the
random regular graph (RRG); (c) snowdrift game on the regular lattice; (d) public goods
games on the regular lattice. Note that these results are in qualitative agreement with
those obtained in Fig.2(a) in that the larger value of u greatly facilitates cooperation.
Depicted results were obtained for K = 0.1.
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4. Conclusion
In summary, we have investigated the effect of redefined fitness on the
cooperative behaviors whin the framework of spatial evolutionary prisoner’s
dilemma game. In the model, the fitness of an individual is evaluated by the
combination of its current payoff and environment (the average value of all
its neighbors’ payoffs). It has been found that integrating neighborhoods in
the evaluation of fitness can promote a remarkably high cooperation level,
especially when it holds larger proportion in the fitness. Via exploring some
typical sub-patterns in spatial games, we have demonstrated that cooperators
considering the influence of environment can better resist the invasion of
defectors.
Further interesting is the fact the increase of the parameter u, marking
more proportion of environment, has altered the effective interaction net-
work, while the similar phenomenon can be observed for public goods games
in [46]. This effective transition of topology structure will provide more ben-
eficial condition to cooperators. To prove the generality of the promotion
effect, we have also examined the cooperative behaviors for different neigh-
borhood sizes, different topology structures and different game models. It is
instructive that the similar results can be observed. Our work reveals that
considering environment i.e., integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of
fitness, plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation, and thus it
may shed a light on understanding the emergence of cooperative behaviors
in natural and social systems.
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